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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL DAVID DESTEFANO,
Plaintiff & Respondent
-vs-

Case No. 860472

OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and MID-CENTURY
EXCHANGE,
Defendant & Appellant
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August

12, 1986, the District Court of Salt Lake County,

with the Honorable
Judgment in

Raymond

favor of

S.

Rule

57,

Utah

provisions

the form

Rules

plaintiff is entitled to
motorists

and

Deanna

coverage for a

1978

entered Summary

recover
of

benefits

Oregon

Cooper
Ford

of a

Declaratory Judgment

of Civil Procedure, declaring that

Automobile Protection Policy Number
Copper

presiding,

the plaintiff and against defendant Oregon

Mutual Insurance Company in
under

Uno

Mutual

under

the uninsured

Insurance

APD063645, issued

Company
to Rod L.

of Bend, Oregon, providing insurance
Pinto

automobile

described

in said

insurance policy.
The court
Exchange be
action.

also ordered that defendant Mid-Century Insurance

granted

Summary

Judgment

of

Dismissal

from this

No appeal from this latter Order has been filed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts
Oregon Mutual
Mr. and

Insurance Company

Mrs. Rod

(R.39-43)
was a

of this case are virtually undisputed.

L. Cooper,

One of

1978 Ford

the vehicles

issued an

automobile policy to

residents of

the state of Oregon.

covered by

the insurance policy

Pinto automobile.(R.44-60)

With the consent of

one of the named insureds, the vehicle was driven to
David

Hancock,

who

worked

dealership.(Dep.11,15)

Defendant

with

the

Utah by Mr.

plaintiff at a local car

Mr. Hancock was interested in selling the

car, and the plaintiff thought he had a buyer for it.(Dep.16)

On

November 17, 1984, Mr. Hancock allowed the plaintiff to drive the
automobile to

Kaysville, Utah to show the car to his prospective

buyer and her parents.
parents decided

After driving the

they wanted

to buy

automobile around, the

the car.(Dep. 16)

With the

plaintiff riding as a passenger, the prospective buyer then drove
the vehicle back to Salt Lake County along the 1-15 freeway until
she ran out of gas at the 90th South on-ramp.(Dep.21)
parked the

car far

plaintiff walked
Mr. Hancock

in his

off the traveled portion of the roadway, the

to the

nearest service

for assistance

tank.(Dep.25,26)

After she

in refilling

Mr. Hancock then drove

Mazda automobile,

bought some

station and telephoned
the Pinto's locked gas
to the

service station

gas, and then transported

the plaintiff and the gas back to the stalled Pinto.(Dep.27)

He

parked the Mazda behind the Pinto, and then the plaintiff got out
of the Mazda and began pouring gasoline into the gas
Pinto.(Dep.30,31)

While

he

tank of the

was pouring the gasoline into the

2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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automobile, an uninsured Volkswagon
the left

rear of

the Mazda

Rabbit

automobile

ran into

vehicle at high speed and pushed it

forward into the rear end of the Pinto
body, causing

serious injury

driver of the

Volkswagon

and into

to the

was

the plaintiff's

plaintiff.(Dep.32-35)

Tammy

Dowdell,

and

she

The

had no

insurance.(Dep.37,44,45)
Because the

driver of

the Volkswagon Rabbit was uninsured,

this action was brought to determine if plaintiff
benefits

under

the

uninsured

Pinto automobile that he was

motorist

servicing

is entitled to

provisions of the Ford
with

gasoline

when the

accident took place*
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT NO.

I:

Since this action does not concern insurance

coverage for no-fault benefits, bodily injury liability, property
damage liability, and medical benefits coverage, there is no need
for

the

Supreme

Court

Limitation Endorsement

to
of the

recover for such benefits
not

relevant

to

the

decide

whether

Young

Driver

insurance policy in question bars

under Oregon

issues

the

Law.

These matters are

decided by the trial court in the

above action.
POINT NO. II:
insurance
persons

Oregon law requires that automobile liability

policies

shall

cover

"occupying"

the

insured

further defined
from" a vehicle.

as being

"in or

losses
vehicle
upon or

arising from injury to
and

"occupying"

is

entering or alighting

The Oregon Supreme Court has held that a person

remains an "occupant" of a vehicle until the person has completed
3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

all

acts

reasonably

circumstances
process

and

or

expected

reasonably

commences

Supreme Court

a

support this

ruling.

be

performed

incidental

new

has adopted

to

course

of

holdings from

Cases from

to

conduct.

or

while

maintenance, use or

performing
operation

the

disembarking
The Oregon

other jurisdictions to

other jurisdictions have held

that a person is "occupying" a vehicle while
perform

the

under

an
of

either preparing to

activity
an

related

insured

to

vehicle*.

the
Where

plaintiff was pouring gasoline into a disabled vehicle, he was in
such close proximity to the
operation and

automobile

and

so

relate*d

to its

use that those activities were an integral part of

its operation that one could say he was "occupying" the vechicle.
POINT NO.
raised no

Ill;

Defendant Oregon

Mutual Insurance Company

issue on the trial court level as to the propriety and

timliness of the court's
are virtually

entry of

undisputed by

Summary Judgment.

all the parties to this action, and

such parties have always assumed that one of them is
Summary Judgment

because of

The facts

the lack

entitled to

of any material issues of

fact remaining to be resolved by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THIS COURT DOES NOT NEED TO DETERMINE IF
THE YOUNG DRIVER LIMITATION ENDORSEMENT
PRECLUDES INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR NO-FAULT
BENEFITS, BODILY INJURY LIABILITY, PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY, AND MEDICAL PAYMENTS .
BENEFITS.
Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance
appeal that

Company

asserts

on this

the trial court erred in failing to determine if the
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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precludes

insurance? ^overatre f\-r no- fau * benefits, bod i y in ur>

liability ,

property

aamage

benefits.

I ha I: argument has

plaintiff

:i s

no t

>r .shys i a

damage n a b i i i ' '

^.; .^m^

r^>.^-

ua . : j . diiu

;t iu luded
exclu^
mn*

l

\.

JLlit- i u d i n g
damage

ot

j

*:,* Young

liibuiea

coverage

-t *o\e"ages is

concedes

Occident

&

Limitation

.

Jt

• H-in-; t J T ^

case,

i^nl in eH

; -

Company v,

o> »>i , . •,
ravmen---.

-*",i i

^x t ^ r .

(

tne

excludes

•VJUJ-I

uninsured

ta

i i a u i L J t .\ .

benefit?

-r^gon

hi-

insured

or )Ut-r * y
pasMiunj?

Supreme

- ^ h ' * d i n 5 c o n c ^ ^n i n -:
- .

this regapt. *c

:

-

As pre\ i ous I v ; r\<i I ca t ed , p t rr
: " M e . o> ,plaintiff
iaj.i
u.a tor- - ii i : h
: seeks
contribution
resulted
from
medical adisabilitv claims under the Personal !:•*•. y
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u^*

n *•• "• a j rig

seated as r o ^ o u .

5

h a s

Rr^ues c o n v e r s e ! v

j } *i

^

76)

Kndorsem^r * d o e s n o t

uzi.ia,

Vi'ung I-r-'w*:* L i m r a t . m Hndors -men"

n^ H a r t f o r d

haJ" the Oregon

Indemnity

" o ^ ; ^ n: ^ r ^ ,>f ^ * under

* * \ an«< m e d i c a l

material

i

Dn\er

*-

injury

J_

w.ii| . t : w

rif

in - i d u i i

*od i I

nedical benef i ts payments

Companv

Hartford

that

liabi

express!'

Insurance

i usuranee

trie

r.st

mat

;^1

bene' i t-

»- u-e

whether t... •} Y oung Dri ver Li mitation

Endorseni^r, - preclude^ sac h a * ai ie f \

*

payments

^ .

t^-fault

d amage coverage

Oregc:

i • ;-dica;

no bear

c1 ai m ;

)Ti Dperty

i i ah Liit

r

xiabiii'

n.

Protection Provisions of this policy. The
parties make the same argument in relation to
these payments as they do to those made under
the Uninsured Motorist Provisions.
Although
the age of the driver is relevant to the
coverage under the Personal Injury Protection
Provision,
it
is unnecessary to decide
whether such coverage was excluded by the
driver restriction endorsement*
(Emphasis
added)
It is likewise unnecessary for the
that broad

question in

court in

this litigation.

Utah to decide

The claim made by the

plaintiff in this action is for uninsured motorist benefits, none
of which

are limited by the Young Driver Limitation Endorsement.

Apparently, defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company

wants some

kind of an advisory opinion on this subject, but there is no need
for the court to indulge in such speculation in the instant case.
POINT NO. II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO RECOVER
UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS UNDER THE
OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY POLICY.
Defendant

Oregon

Mutual

Insurance

appeal that the trial court erroneously
entitled to

recover uninsured

As a basis for

this claim,

Company argues on this
held that

plaintiff was

motorist benefits in this action.

defendant claims

that plaintiff was

not "occupying" the insured vehicle when the accident took place.
Defendant has correctly pointed out that Oregon law provides
that automobile liability insurance
from

injury

to

persons

shall

"occupying"

cover

losses arising

the insured vehicle. That

status is statutorily defined as a person who
entering or alighting from" an insured vehicle.

is "in

or upon or

Defendant argues

6 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I 1 i ill I

Defenda

* 4 - artjum^nt

** - ir,

'ii~

* ha1

(1984)
^ .^T

••

MI«1

tin i II i

II ni e

. - based s o l e s v up«m the Oregon case (if

tOmobi-t c

9^9

HI

thoui aaur

State Farm

uOdiu an v

^61 g ,

a:s ~ *eking

6 8 ! ) Il "'

"I l

a declaration

, i i .r\ p , , M ^ o t i o n coverage of

th*^ persona-

ei sc ll t i lb. :::: i
* r r >u

i

automohi

-

exp-a.r.*-

tnother

venici^

ue f a c t s ar*
.

he oou

ari j

r rtu •*

• *PMt-ha*

s

^y

its

*npj.icated,

ii nsured " s

but

: < \.± . .

We 3umiliar «- ' n* stipulated r acis
Berg was
driving a \ehicle
southbound
r- Interstate
Highway 5 when her vehicle collided head-on
with a vehicle being
operated northbound in
•.••the southbound
lanes of th*> freeway. Bei g
•. was thrown from her \ehicle by the impact and
landed somewhere
in t.he southbound lanes. A
truck driver who witnessed
the oo] lision sa i i
Berg try to a f t her head and right arm In i t
otherwise remain stationary.
He then saw the
Miller
vehicle
approach t.ht Accident scene,
swerve, skid
sideways, strike Berg and drag
her a distance before stopping with her under
a portion
ri1 i1
truck driver told
..Miller, "G^t ort ot her, ' and Mi ller drove
her car forward and over Berg. Miller felt a
"thump" wh• ~j *^:
- i*
was skidding, and a
second
"thumjwn;i^ driving
forward ^ n
compliance wi * ^ * v* truck d r i v e r s .iireotivp
1

.* t-

m argued

because -h- vS- >•f
the

insured

considered
' pedes t r i a i
••

l

n^:_ iJerg wa<? no+- en: \ j --vi -w i

. . ^destnan

t! * <* * i A\-> she

v

-

^^ div/Lu^-.i
I-'UIS

they are

J • i u^ Berg

a oerson * •

* -

oa^e,
?

*

' •

;jein-fi"*"s

was --triune by
* .: •

'-nder Oregor:

(^MjpviMj

t
iau

^ s*^ I f-~ ^*~'>oe < ] ^ d

sa:
7
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igon

Court to define the word "occupying" to determine

if Berg

was a

pedestrian.
In ruling

against the insurance company and in finding that

Berg was not "occupying"

the vehicle

she was

ejected from, the

court made the following explanation:
Following her involuntary ejection from
her vehicle, Berg landed in a traffic lane
where, except for attempting to lift her head
and right arm, she remained stationary. From
the time she landed on the highway until the
time she was struck by Miller's vehicle, she
was apparently
not ambulatory.
In our
opinion,
those
facts
permit
no other
conclusion but that Berg at that point had
completed all acts that a person in her
circumstances reasonably would be expected to
have done. She had gone as far as she was
going to go in leaving her vehicle; in fact,
as far as she could go.
She was not
"alighting"
from
the
vehicle; she had
"alighted".
That she then did not seek a place of
safety or embark on a different course of
conduct is not dispositive; she was unable to
do so.
We find that Berg completed the
"alighting " process upon coming to rest on
the pavement. From then on she no longer was
"occupying" her vehicle
and
her status
necessarily was that of a pedestrian within
the policy and statutory definitions.
The
trial court erred in concluding that she was,
as a matter of law, "occupying" her vehicle.
Based
Insurance

upon
Company

plaintiff was not
pouring gas

the

above

now

asks

occupying

into the

language,
this
the

fuel tank.

completely different than the
the language
result.

of the

Berg case

defendant

court
insured

Oregon Mutual

to determine that the
vehicle

when

he was

The facts of the Berg case are

matter now

before the

court, and

would actually compel a contrary

After noting that no Oregon cases

(prior to

8 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Berg) have

c o n s i d e i e cii t h e

ci e f :i n :i t :i o n o i

t h e c o n t e x t o f i 1:1 s u r a n c e
A pp e a 1 s o f

:: :> 1:1 2 e • ]::: t 3

s o m e wh a t 1 e n g t h y,

o c c i i p y :i n gf"" o i

po 1 i c i e s and

0 r ego n r e v i ewe d

: c 1:1 s i d e r t h o 3 e

!f

th e 1 e ad i ng
'I h • s>

""' p e d e s t r :i a n,l! ' "( J :i t h i n.

0 r e g o n 1 a w,

the Court o f

c a s e s i n t h e f :i e 1 d t h a t

1 a11g 1 1ag e

:• f

th 2

: • :> 1 1,1: I:, a J t h

:i s qu o t e d h e r e i n s o t h e c o u r t w 1 11 c 1 e a r J: y s e e

the error of t h e a r g u m e n t m a d e by the d e f e n d a n t in its M e m o r a n d u m
: f \ 1 ithori t:i e s .

•; • . ,• • /.. •.

;

• '.

. . . . .

No Oregon cases have considered the definition .-f
"occupying" or "pedestrian" within the context or
insurance policies and ORS 743.800.
The parties,
however, have cited us to a number of decisions from
other jurisdicti ons construing si mi 1 ar or ident ;- provisions.
S e e , e.g. U n i t e d S t a t e s
Fide 1 i t y .k.
Guaranty v.
Daly, 384 S o . 2 d T 3 50 ~~ (F1a.App.198 0 ) :
Industrial Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Collier, 334
So.2d 148 (Fla.App.1976); Stoddard v. "AID" Insurance
Co. (Mutual)t
97 Idaho 508, 547 PIId 1113 (1976
Nelson v. Iowas Mutual Insurance Company, 16 3 Mon*
515 P.2d 362 (1973); Kantola v. State Farm In,.
Ohio Misc. 11 , 405 N.E.2d 744 (1979).
We find • JS>«- u«- . - ,
'"alighting from' most notewurilj,. . -n S to.i^a . -1 v , ^_
Insurance
Co.
(Mutual) ,
supr
\t insured, a
paraplegic, had parked his car in a garage and begun to
get out of it by hoisting himself into a wheelchair
•-hen he noted leaking gasoline; he traveled toward the
rear of the .car by grasping it and pulling himself
along, inspected, the gas tank cover, and then noticed
flames.
He was burned, while leaving the garage. In
determining whether the insured \ ras covered under a
policy provision that defined "" occupying" as "in or
upon or entering into or alighting from,"' ,. the court
held. that he was "occupying"' the car in terms of
"alighting from" it because he had not completed all
acts that could reasonably be expected from those in
similar situation, not all acts whi ch would normally be
performed in 1 eaving the car, and he had not embarked
upon an entirely distinct course of conduct.
(He had
not taken hi s packages with him and had not closed the
car door.) 9' i Idaho at 51.1 547 P. Id 1113.
Kantola v.
State Farm Insurance» supra, was an action to recover
for injuries sustained by a child who was struck by a
motor vehicle whi 1 e crossing the road after ge11ing off
a school bus. I he issue before
the court was whether •
9
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the child was "occupying" the bus when injured; the
policies of insurance defined "occupying" to include
"alighting from". The court held that "alighting from"
a school bus included reaching a place of safety,
because that
is a
course of conduct reasonably
incidental to leaving and alighting from a school bus,
which was statutorily required to remain stopped as a
protective measure until the child reached such place.
62 Ohio Misc. at 13, 405 N.E.ld 744.
The import of these cases appears to be that a
person remains an "occupant" of a vehicle until the
person has completed all acts reasonably expected to be
performed under
the
circumstances
or reasonably
incidental to the disembarking process and commences a
new course of conduct.
Terms used in insurance
into",

"alighting

from",

policies such
"getting

out"

as "upon", "entering
or

"getting off" are

exemplified by decisions that upheld coverage for a
was

injured

while

he

stood

beside

a taxi to pay the driver,

Allstate Ins. CO. v. Flaumenbaum, 62 Misc.2d 32,
447 (1970),

and for

a claimant

who was

motorist while unlocking the door of
Doe, 221

So.2d 666 (Louisiana 1969).

that resolve
are

coverage disputes

considered

as

a

group,

vehicle, Box v.

When the judicial opinions
and similar situations

seem to define the coverage

provisions "upon", "entering into", or "alighting
of a

305 N.Y.Supp.2d

struck by an uninsured

an insured

in these
they

claimant who

from" in terms

reasonable perimeter around an insured vehicle.

So long as

drivers or passengers are within an area that is reasonably close
to an insured vehicle, they are covered by the uninsured motorist
insurance.
Co., 37

Estate of Cepeda v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty

App.Div.2d 454,

326 N.Y. Supp. 864 (1971); Schindler v.

Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 41 Misc.2d 590, 245
N.Y. Supp. 90 (1963) .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Additionally, there are many appellate opinions interpreting
the

term

injured

"occupying"
while

in

either

preparing

activity related to

the

insured

A

vehicle.

situations
to

in

which

perform

maintenance,

use

claimants were

or

or

performing an

operation

of an

Louisiana decision approved recovery by a

deputy sheriff who was standing between the Sheriff's vehicle and
a stalled

car in order to attach a pair of jumper cables when an

uninsured motorist ran into
and

pinned

Girley,

260

Wisconsin
struck a

the

deputy

La.

car

claimant was

between

223,

decision

the back

255

upheld

pinning

a

holding a

of the

stalled automobile

the two parked cars.

So.2d

748

coverage
claimant

(1971).

Similarly, a

when an uninsured motorist
between

two

vehicles where

spare tire that was intended to separate

and protect the bumpers of the cars when the second
to

push

the

N.W.2d 148

first

(1975).

represented by

car.

In

A clear

several feet from the
chains.
chains

statement of

the California

Cocking,

car was used

Moherek v. Tucker, 69 Wise. 41, 230

Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
(1970).

Smith v.

the

judicial attitude is

decision of Cocking v. State Farm

6 Cal.App.3d

965, 86

Cal.Rptr. 193

claimant was injured while standing

insured vehicle

preparing to

put on snow

The court viewed the preparations for affixing the snow
as

relationship

placing
to

the

the

claimant

car"

to

"in

bring

afforded to persons who are "upon"

the

requisite

physical

him within the protection

an insured

vehicle.

Id. at

197.
In the present case, defendants in support of their argument
11
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that

plaintiff

was

plaintiff's efforts

not

occupying

to fill

the fuel

had embarked in a completely
occupying

the

vehicle

further contend
vehicle for

that

as

the

course

passenger

plaintiff

had

of

that

conduct than

or driver.

not

occupied

Defendants
the insured

the considerable period of time it took to telephone

Mr. Hancock, wait for Mr. Hancock's arrival, attempt
gas tank,

state

tank was evidence that he

different
a

vehicle

and otherwise

complete all

to fill the

acts that a person in his

circumstances reasonably would be expected to

do.

The court in

Rice v. Allstate Ins. Co., 38 App.Div.2d 491, 330 N.Y.Supp.2d 660
(1972) upheld coverage for a claimant who was driving one
vehicles being

taken to

the same

when the claimant was struck
walked from

the lead

registration papers
against

the

insurer

by

destination.
an

vehicle to
to the
of

uninsured

Injury occurred
motorist

second

A

claim was allowed

vehicle,

even though the

claimant had never occupied or driven that vehicle
of the

trip prior to the accident.

as she

the second vehicle to give the

other driver.
the

of two

in the course

The court reasoned "that the

claimant had sufficiently made out her connection with . .

. the

car to establish her status as a passenger in that car . . . "

Id

at 494.
In Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance

Company v. Collier,

334 So.2d 148 (FLa.App.1976), the Florida Court considered a case
very similar to the one now before this
the appellee

was driving

of the tires became flat.

court.

In that action,

his Volkswagon home from work when one
During the

time he

was changing the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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tire, his

car was

struck by another automobile which caused the

Volkswagon to strike and injure him.
he

was

standing

outside

the

At the time he was injured,

Volkswagon

removing the spare tire from it.

with

Appellee

it

jacked up,

sought benefits under

the PIP provisions of the insurance policy on the car that struck
the Volkswagon.
that he

The Florida

court

denied

benefits

on grounds

was "occupying" his own Volkswagon while he was changing

the tire on that vehicle.
The Supreme Court of Montana in the case

of Nelson

v. Iowa

Mutual Insurance Company, 163 Mont. 82, 515 P.2d 362 (1973), held
that a lady was still "occupying" her automobile (for purposes of
PIP benefits)

when she

froze to

death after getting out of her

disabled automobile and proceeded
fence which

was constructed

She followed the fence
ditch at

which time

south behind

of both

a distance

the car

barb wire and sheep fence.

of 269

feet and

fell into a

she fractured or dislocated her ankle.

then began crawling back to her car and was found
feet behind the automobile.

temperature.

The

She

dead about 143

Death was caused by frostbite and as

a consequence of the injury to her ankle,
cold

along a

blood loss,

shock and

Montana court said that the deceased's

activities after the accident were solely directed to extricating
herself from

the car

to a

reasonably carried out

and

place of
was

safety.

reasonably

Such activity was
connected

with the

operation of the vehicle.
The

cases

of

Robson

Company, 393 NE 2d 1053 (Ohio

v.

Lightning
1978) and

Rod

Mutual Insurance

Manning v.
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Summit Home

Insurance Company,
point.

623 P.2d

1235 (Ariz.

In the Robson case, Robson was

automobile.

a passenger

in Zaleski's

They had visited a friend in a hospital and gone to

a basketball game.
stereo which
evening.

1980), are directly in

They stopped at Robson's

they intended

to take

house to

to a friend's house for the

While Robson was placing the stereo

of Zaleski's

car and

was struck by an

moving other

in the

open truck

items into the trunk, Robson

uninsured motorist.

motorist benefits

pick up a

Robson

claimed uninsured

under Zaleski's policy with Lightning Rod, and

it refused coverage.

The court

held that

the plaintiff

was in

sufficiently close contact with the insured's automobile so as to
come within

the protection

of the

defendant's insurance policy

and that plaintiff was either upon or entering into the insured's
vehicle at the time of the accident.
In the Manning case, Summit issued
policy

to

coverage.
vehicle,

Joey

Santa

Maria

containing

The coverage was for
and

the

policy

mountains

encountered icy
tire chains.

with

defined

Manning

out of
him.
in

the car,

moved some

as

passenger,

was straightening

rear tire,

car

and

moved

to

Santa

his car

Maria

to put on
out a chain

Manning got

a camera

distance away and took a picture of

At Santa Maria's request for help, she replaced
the

the insured

"occupying" as in or upon or

and stopped

Santa Maria

preparatory to putting it on a

motorist

While on a vacation trip in the

road conditions
While

uninsured

persons "occupying"

entering into or alighting from.
Colorado

its automobile liability

the

the camera

side of the car to offer help.
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Manning was

standing two or three feet from the car when she was

struck and injured by
motorist•

another

vehicle

Summit denied coverage.

driven

by

an uninsured

The appellate court held:

"In our opinion the better reasoned cases
indicate that if one's activities are in such
close proximity to the car and so related to
its operation and use that they are an
integral part of one's occupancy and use of
the car, then one may be said to be fupon'
the car, and that the operative facts here
clearly indicate that not
only had the
appellant
actually
been
actively
participating in the overall tire chaining
project, but also that her location at the
time of the accident was controlled by the
necessity of her continued participation."
The

evidence

in

this

activities in putting gas
close proximity

to the

case

in the

shows

that

the

Pinto automobile

Pinto automobile

and so

operation and use that those activities were an
one's

occupancy

and

use

of

plaintiff's
were in such

related to its
integral part of

the Pinto automobile and that the

plaintiff may be said to be upon that automobile.
Existing
position that

case

policy

offers

plaintiff was

purposes of being
Mutual

law

by

deemed
virtue

overwhelming

the vehicle,

the

an

insured

of

person

under

the Oregon

both his proximity to the insured
his activity

in pouring

such activity being related to the use or

maintenance of the vehicle.
plaintiff was

for

"occupying" the insured vehicle for

vehicle at the time of the accident and
gas into

support

The trial court

correctly held that

"occupying" the Pinto automobile when the accident

took place.
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POINT NO. 3
THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS
ACTION WAS BOTH TIMELY AND PROPER.
The
Insurance

last

two

Company

points
on

raised

this

by

appeal

defendant

concern

Oregon Mutual

the

propriety and

timeliness of the trial court's entry of Summary Judgment.
issues come as a surprise
appeal shows
court

that defendant

level.

On

Memoranda filed

the

action.

the

raised no

and

defendant

indicated

by all

defendant

Exchange consistently agreed with

in its

the parties to

Mid-Century Insurance

Oregon Mutual

that no factual

determined by the trail court.

words, all of the parties agreed that no genuine issue
material fact

record on

such issues at the trial

virtually undisputed

to be

The

trial court and in its Brief on Appeal

Plaintiff

dispute remained

respondent.

contrary,

with the

that the facts were
this

to

These

remained to

be determined

that one of the parties was entitled to

In other
as to any

by the trial court and
judgment as

a matter of

law.
Regarding the

timeliness of the Summary Judgment, it should

be noted that defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company filed its
first

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

Motion was denied without prejudice to
the

other

defendant

to

that

the

Nevertheless,

issues
the

could

court

enable the

be

allowed

was needed

resolved
the

as

That

plaintiff and

conduct discovery proceedings.

Mutual argued that no further discovery
and

on February 5, 1986.

Oregon

at that time

a matter of law.

parties

depositions at that time.
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to

take

some

A

few

Mutual

months

filed

Memorandum

later,

its

in

second

support

undisputed facts and
resolved

by

the

on

10, 1986, defendant Oregon

Motion

for

that

Motion

of

again

court

July

implied

as

a

Summary

Its

carefully outlined the

that

matter

Judgment.

the

of

issues

law.

Memorandum filed in opposition to plaintiff's

could be

In its reply

Motion for Summary

Judgment, Oregon Mutual failed to raise any questions of fact and
failed

to

assert

that

entry

of

Summary

Judgment

would

be

premature or contrary to Rule 56.
The matters set forth in Arguments III and IV of Appellant's
Brief are raised for the first time on
has ruled

on a

number of

this appeal.

occasions that

This court

a party may not raise

matters on appeal that were not first heard and considered by the
trial

court.

See

Company,

Inc,

608

permitted

to

raise

L.A.

Drywall Inc. v. Whitmore Construction

P.2d
new

626.

Oregon

issues

on

should reject its assertions

that

Mutual

should

not be

this appeal, and the court

the

trial

court's

entry of

Summary Judgment was improper and untimely.
CONCLUSION
For reasons

set forth

Summary Judgment of

the

herein, the

trial

court

court should affirm the
and

award

costs

to the

plaintiff in connection with this appeal.
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